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Abstract 
This paper analyses the role of Mexico as security provider or source of insecurity through the analysis 
of regional security governance. It argues that in contrast with other countries in the region such as 
Brazil, which has displayed policies aimed at building a node of regional security, Mexico has become 
a reluctant regional security provider as a result of its traditional historical inward looking roots and 
the inherent state weaknesses augmented by the current instability in the area of security. This paper 
looks into four categories of security governance (assurance, prevention, protection and compellence) 
in order to evaluate the role of Mexico in the context of regional security. Part of the task of this paper 
will be to explore the extent in which Mexico carries out one or more of these dimensions and the 
extent in which it contributes to regional (collective) security governance.  
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 1 
Introduction 
As the cyclical economic crises of the end of presidential administrations have been absent since 1994 
and the alternation of political parties in the executive powers of the three levels of government has 
been part of the democratic normalcy, some analysts have argued that Mexico, along with South 
Korea, Indonesia, and Turkey (MIST countries), should be included in the group of significant 
economies of the multipolar world. This positive perception of Mexico contrasts with the “war on 
drugs” that Mexico has waged against organized crime organization since the mid-2000s resulting in 
the deaths of more than 60,000 people. This paper analyses the role of Mexico as security provider or 
source of insecurity through the analysis of regional security governance. It argues that in contrast 
with other countries in the region such as Brazil, which has displayed policies aimed at building a 
node of regional security, Mexico has become a reluctant regional security provider as a result of its 
traditional historical inward looking roots and the inherent state weaknesses augmented by the current 
instability in the area of security. This paper looks into four categories of security governance 
(assurance, prevention, protection and compellence) in order to evaluate the role of Mexico in the 
context of regional security. Part of the task of this paper will be to explore the extent in which Mexico 
carries out one or more of these dimensions and the extent in which it contributes to regional 
(collective) security governance.  
Regional Perceptions of Threats and Security Policies 
The transformations of the Mexican security perceptions and policies have changed in the past decades 
according to the nature of the threats. This evolution is clearly divided into four periods. The first 
lasted from the end of World War II to the late 1970s. While economic growth, social peace, and 
stable borders made a national debate on security unnecessary, the government primarily equated the 
concept of security with control of dissident groups, and relied upon intelligence activities and force to 
do so. Monitoring the activities of opposition leaders and co-optation were strategies of the 
governmental apparatus to manage subtly political dissidence. Likewise, when the government felt 
threatened by public demonstrations, military force was used, notably the suppression of student 
protests in 1968 and 1971. 
The second period was initiated in the early 1980s. The historical context facilitated the conditions 
to broaden and externalize the concept of security as a result of two main events during this period. 
The first was a reaction to the Central American conflicts, the other being the discovery of new oil 
reserves that created the illusion in the governing elite that the time to project the Mexican power 
abroad had come, particularly in Central America. The de la Madrid administration (1982-1988) 
attempted to define the concept of national security for the first time in the National Development 
Plan, including elements such as economic development of the nation, the maintenance of liberty, 
peace and social justice, and the primary function of the armed forces as guarantors of national 
security. 
The third period was distinguished by the convergence of domestic and external factors. Internally, 
the political system crumbled in the electoral fraud in 1988 and as drug trafficking organizations 
gradually scaled to the top of the government’s security concerns and displaced organized domestic 
political opposition as the internal threat to the Mexican state. Externally, the end of the Cold War 
motivated the Salinas de Gortari Administration (1988-1994) to negotiate the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was intended to reinforce the opening of the political system and 
to mark the formal transition of an inward-oriented and protectionist economic model to an outward-
oriented open economy. The National Development Plan of the Salinas de Gortari Administration 
stated that one of the objectives of the Mexican security was to act decisively to avoid any action that 
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could threaten national security. Likewise, the same document included drug trafficking as the main 
threat to security (Bagley and Quezada 1993). 
The fourth period started with the inauguration of the Fox Administration (2000-2006), the first 
government from an opposition party in seven decades. Within the new government the post of the 
national security advisor was created, whose main responsibility was to coordinate a long-term 
perspective on national security, national sovereignty, preservation of the rule of law and democratic 
governability. Despite high expectations for real change, the transformations were partial, and 
unfortunately, the Fox was unable to inhibit the spread of organized crime, which has since amassed 
unprecedented power and became the most important item on the national security agenda under the 
administration of President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) (Rodríguez Sumano 2007). The return of the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 2012, continues the confrontation of drug trafficking 
organization and the attempt of a new design of the security forces based on the French model of 
gendarmerie.  
The current challenges for Mexican security in the second decade of the twenty-first century are 
reflected in the priorities already mentioned, as well in public opinion. According to the several 
surveys of “Mexico, the Americas, and the World”, the main threat for national security is drug-
trafficking and organized crime, which was ranked as the number one threat in 2012, with 82 percent 
of respondents identifying them as a “grave threat” (González et al. 2012). This perception has been 
consistent over the four editions of the survey (2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010, 2012), which reiterates 
that the main source of threat in Mexico is domestic. Other high ranked threats, in the 2012 survey, are 
weapons trafficking (ranked fifth), nuclear weapons (ranked seventh) and international terrorism 
(ranked eighth) as an intermediate threat. In a regional context, Mexicans are less worried about 
border conflicts (ranked tenth), territorial disputes (ranked eleventh), and instability in neighbouring 
countries (ranked twelfth). 
Sources of Power 
Jim O’Neill, chairperson of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, became famous worldwide in 2001 
when he coined the catchy acronym BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). The analysis of 
O’Neil has once again indicated the significant role of a new group of four fast-track growing 
countries: Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, and Turkey. Since the days when Mario Vargas Llosa 
coined the phrase “Mexico: The Perfect Dictatorship”,1 the country has consolidated the open 
economy model and improved the democratic standards. Freedom for political participation and 
contestation are now part of the normal political culture and reforms have made political institutions 
more accountable. While the general trend is stimulating for improving quality of life in Mexico, there 
are still challenges to overcome: income inequality remains one of the largest in the world, the 
government runs into obstacles to effectively solve problems that citizens face, consensus is hard to 
reach in the legislative power, and the judiciary and police are still plagued by corruption (Martinez-
Gallardo 2013) despite the democratization of the past two decades (Morris 2009).
2
 
From the economic perspective, Mexico has implemented sound policy frameworks since the end 
of the 1980s, which have resulted in developing favorable financial conditions that have supported 
national economic activity. Placed as the second largest economy in Latin America and closely 
integrated with the US industrial production, Mexico has remained resilient to the 2008-2013 US 
                                                     
1
 A combination of democratic and authoritarian practices that guaranteed stable, effective government with minimal 
oppression.  
2
 Morris argues that “limited support linking democracy to lower levels of corruption and success at combating 
corruption… the defeat of the PRI at the state level and the rise of opposition-controlled state executives did seem to play 
a role in lowering the overall levels of corruption and perception, but the impact seemed to diminish somewhat over 
time” (191)  
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economic crisis and the financial turmoil in Europe. Simultaneously, the Mexican economy still needs 
to reduce inequality in order to consolidate its project. Based on World Bank figures, the number of 
Mexicans living in poverty in 2010 was 46.2 percent of Mexico’s total population, while 10.4 percent 
was in extreme poverty in spite of targeted social protection programs such as the Oportunidades 
conditional cash transfer initiative and the Seguro Popular universal health insurance (World Bank 
2013). 
While Mexico has held three peaceful electoral processes since the end of the PRI rule in 2000, the 
consolidation of the democratic political system is not experiencing a linear evolution in the direction 
of democratic consolidation. Instead, as Dreser argues, “the political system seems to be caught in a 
permanent, uneasy tug-of-war between the past and the future, between change and actors who seek to 
place obstacles in its path… …what the presidency had given up or forced to concede, Congress has 
gained… What the executive relinquished, vested interests have been quick to pick up” (Dreser 2008, 
242). In light of all these transformations, drug traffickers and organized crime organizations have 
overshadowed the achievements in Mexico’s economic area and the democratic transition. Security 
has become one of the most significant challenges in Mexico. By mid-2013, it was estimated that 
Mexico’s drug war had caused 70,000 deaths in six years (Thomson 2013). This dramatic number was 
the result of the convergence of several elements. While the PRI regime was able to contain the 
problems of drug trafficking rather than confronting them, the transition to democracy opens an 
opportunity for organized crime to infiltrate political parties as well as municipal government around 
the country.  
Externally, other factors also contribute to increase the power of drug trafficking organizations: 
breaking up the two main major Colombian cartels, disruption of traditional supply routes and 
tightened up of security measures of the US southern border, among others (Bow and Santa Cruz 
2013, 2-24). While the Fox Administration made some changes to deal with the problem, the Calderon 
Administration waged a military frontal war against cartels that were seeking to seize and to maintain 
control over several areas of the territory. The Peña Nieto Administration continued the militarization 
of the conflict and simultaneously emphasized the role of development as the tool to break the vicious 
circle of poverty and organized crime. In this context, the militarization and the escalation of violence 
also increased human rights abuses committed by troops, eroded civilian oversight, and undermined 
coordination efforts between security agencies (Sotomayor 2013, 42-3).  
Security Governance Policies 
Assurance Policies  
The non-intervention principle has been one of the main pillars of Mexican foreign policy. As an 
approach, it was quite useful during the decades of PRI rule in Mexico because it acted as a shield 
against criticisms pointing to the absence of democracy within the country. This explains why 
Mexico’s participation in United Nations (UN) missions in post-conflict areas was not foreseen as part 
of the national agenda. To date, Mexico’s only participation in a post-conflict operation has been with 
United Nations Observers Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), which was established under Security 
Council Resolution 693 (1991) on 20 May 1991. While the ONUSAL mission focused on human 
rights, and deployed military and police contingents, the Mexican contribution to the operation was 
limited to the participation of a small group of police officers. In 2000, the Fox administration 
examined the possibility of partaking in UN peacekeeping operations. The initial responses from 
Congress and the public were negative and reflected the fact that the non-intervention principle is still 
an essential part of the Mexican security and political cultures. Mexican society remained divided on 
this issue; in a 2012-13 public opinion poll, only 37 per cent of the respondents would support 
Mexican participation.  
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The Mexican government has limited plans for aiding in foreign economic reconstruction owing to 
internal economic restrictions of the overall Mexican budget. The last significant contribution took 
place in the early 1990s, when Mexico contributed to El Salvador’s reconstruction. Since then, the 
Mexican government has not employed systematic policies in this area. A second area in which the 
Mexican government has intervened in post-conflict situations with economic or financial aid was the 
Guatemalan migration to Southern Mexico in the early 1980s. In this regard, the United Nations High 
Commissioners for Refugees (UNHCR) opened an office in 1983 to support Mexico’s efforts to help 
thousands of Guatemalan refugees, many of whom either became Mexican citizens or returned to 
Guatemala. This policy eventually decreased the number of Guatemalan refugees in Mexico from 
34,569 in 1996 to 3,229 in 2005 (Echandi 2007). It is calculated that in 2013 there were only 1520 
refugees and 357 asylum seekers in Mexico and the contributions to UNHRC have decreased from 
$100,000 in 2008 to $25,000 in 2013 (UNHCR 2013). Noticeably, while the vast majority of the 
original refugee population was from Guatemala, today, the largest number of refugees originates 
from El Salvador (UNHCR 2008a).  
While war has been absent in Central America for more than a decade, the reconstruction and 
development of the region has been of interest to Mexican government. Accordingly, the Fox 
Administration laid out a broad vision for the economic and social development of the region and, in 
2001, proposed the Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP) for regional development in southern Mexico and 
Central America. In 2006, Colombia also joined the Plan (Roett 2005). Showcasing the concrete 
initiatives generated by this program, during the 2008 Summit of the PPP, the heads of state agreed to 
create a Housing Program for Central America with the aim of building 50,000 houses for $33 million 
(Presidency of the Republic 2008a). The PPP transformed into the Meso-American Project in 2009. 
Finally, the Mexican government also assists with economic reconstruction in areas, which affected 
by natural disasters. Mexico regularly sends assistance mission in cases of natural disasters in Central 
America, and when it has been requested, sends missions to South America and even the United 
States. Mexico's unprecedented offer to aid in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina combined with 
America’s unprecedented acceptance of the aid brought the first deployment of troops from the 
Mexican Army into Texas since the U.S.-Mexican War of 1846-48. The aid to disaster victims of 
Hurricane Katrina included assistance ranging from 195 Army troops to 162 tons of food, clothing, 
and medicine to two ambulances with mobile surgical units (Córdoba 2005). 
Prevention Policies 
Prevention policies encompass democratization, mediation of conflicts and immigration, among other 
policies. Mexico was traditionally reluctant to include the spread of democracy as an element of 
foreign policy. After the 2000 democratic bonus encouraged decision makers to make democracy part 
of foreign policies, some actions in such direction fired back. President Vicente Fox became more 
assertive with regard to the role of democracy in foreign policy. The main target of democratization 
was once Castro’s regime. Several diplomatic disagreements between Mexico and Cuba in 2002 made 
it clear that Cuba had become a liability for Mexico’s foreign policy due to the Cuban regime’s 
responses. Under the Calderon and Pena Nieto administrations, the promotion of democracy 
promotion was back into the lower priorities of Mexican foreign policy. 
With regard to forestalling international conflicts via negotiated settlements, Mexico has cautiously 
promoted negotiated peace settlements in a few cases. Mexico actively participated with the Contadora 
Group in the mediation of Central American conflicts during the 1980s. Then in the 1990s, Mexico 
was a key player for a peace agreement in El Salvador; it also used its diplomatic good offices and 
mediation to assist negotiations between the Colombian government and guerrilla groups. In this 
century, Mexico has withdrawn itself from being a location for peace settlements. For example, even 
in the case of the Colombian conflict, Mexico closed down the representation of an Colombian 
insurgent movement in Mexico City.  
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Unlike the discrete use of diplomacy in conflict prevention, migration is of the utmost relevance for 
the Mexican society. Mexico is as an exporter and transit country for economic migrants. Its 
geographic proximity to the U.S. labor market has made the United States an attractive destination for 
more than 18 million Mexicans. Likewise, the shared border of 3,200 kilometers is a great attraction 
for citizens from Central and South America, who use Mexico as a bridge to the American dream. 
With this in mind, three main security-migration complexes can be identified. The first pertains to the 
role of Mexicans immigrants in the United States has in the Mexican economy; the second is the 
securitization of immigration policies in the United States; and, the third is the problem of organized 
crime in Mexico, particularly with regard to transit migrants from Central America.  
Mexico is by far the most significant emigration country amongst the OECD. Almost five hundred 
thousand undocumented Mexicans immigrate to the United States every year with most crossing the 
border to seek employment in the agriculture, construction, and service industries. Since the early 
1980s, the number of Mexican emigrants, as percentage of the Mexican population, has grown from 4 
to 11 percent in 2005 (Fitzgerald 2006). In response, U.S. local, state, and federal governments have 
launched policy initiatives including the building of higher walls along the border, expanding guest 
worker programs, and even deporting undocumented workers (Escobar Latapí and Martin 2006). 
Particularly in the context of the current recession in the U.S. economy and in the aftermath of the 11 
September attacks, negative views towards immigration have gained greater prominence in the United 
States.  
From the Mexican perspective, the economic impact of a massive deportation of Mexicans or even 
higher unemployment rates would reduce the significant annual remittances to Mexico, which 
amounted to $25 billion in 2007. As most of the remittances are used for consumption, the Mexican 
government has developed programs to institutionalize the emigrants’ ties to Mexico. They have 
organized emigrants to invest in their communities through the 3x1 program, where each dollar 
invested by a migrant organization in their hometowns is matched by an additional dollar by both the 
local and federal governments. This program has expanded fourfold in the past five years and its 
procedures have been modified to allow for more projects. 
The second element to consider is the securitization of immigration in the United States. While the 
prospects of comprehensive migration reform seem unlikely in the near future, an alternative solution 
has been stopping the undocumented migration with the recent construction of a fence between both 
countries. As of December 2008, a pedestrian fence of 370 miles and a vehicle fence of 300 miles 
were completed along the southwest border of the United States (Security 2008). The United States 
has also expanded the border patrol from 6,000 officers in 1996 to 18,000 today, an increase 
representing the largest expansion of a U.S. agency in history. Likewise, in January 2008, Homeland 
Security Secretary, Michael Chertoff, stated that, consistent with the recommendations of the 9-11 
commission, the U.S. government would end the process of accepting oral declarations of citizenship 
at land and sea ports and would begin the process of strictly regulating the kinds of documents 
accepted points of entry (Chertoff and Mukasey 2008). 
At the regional level, far from being a solid regional security complex, Canada, Mexico, and the 
U.S. have established the Security and Prosperity Partnership in order to increase border security. In 
its first stages, agencies from both countries are harmonizing risk assessment mechanisms, exchanging 
information, and establishing protocols to facilitate detection of fraud and smuggling. Under the 
United States-Mexico Voluntary Repatriation Program, more than 35,000 persons were returned to 
their home in a secure, legal, and humanitarian way in 2006 alone.  
The third component is the securitization of migration policies in Mexico. Since 2000, the National 
Migration Institute (NMI) has been in charge of coordinating the protection of migrants, particularly 
with the creation of the Beta Groups. These groups attempt to save the lives of migrants in “dangerous 
zones.” Originally organized to deal with migrants in the northern regions of Mexico, the Beta groups 
have increased their presence along the southern border and have steadily expanded in size to sixteen 
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groups; in 2007, they rescued 6,091 migrants in dangerous situations, and it was in this context that the 
NMI was legally recognized as institutional body of the Mexican National Security Council in 2005. 
While the number of immigrants going to Mexico is quite small, the government has developed 
policies to prevent irregular legal situations with non-citizens residing in Mexico. In 2010, the 
numbers of immigrants within Mexico accounted for only 0.5 percent of the country's total population; 
a large majority of the migrants come from the United States (69 percent), followed by Central 
America (9 percent), and South America (5.9 percent) (United Nations 2006a). In order to prevent an 
increasing number of illegal residents, the Mexican government has initiated programs to normalize 
the immigration process for foreigners living in Mexico. From 2002 to 2007, 17, 658 foreigners 
normalized their legal immigration situations in Mexico (INM 2007).  
Protection Policies 
Protection policies encompass a variety of areas, ranging from health to organized crime, terrorism, 
and environmental degradation. In the area of terrorism, the incidents have been isolated and already 
linked to guerrilla organizations, and more recently to organized crime. Thus, some actions, 
presumably targeted at other drug trafficking groups, have unfortunately affected innocent citizens. On 
15 September 2008, the public was outraged when a drug trafficking group hurled two grenades into a 
crowd of innocent people on Independence Day in the state of Michoacán. Eight people were killed 
and more than 100 people were injured. At the international level, the Mexican government has sought 
to link domestic and international counterterrorist initiatives by establishing the High Level 
Specialized Committee (HLSC) in May 2007. The aim of this committee was to create international 
collaborations in order to deal with terrorism, disarmament, and international security. In particular, 
this committee is in charge of implementing three important UN Security Council Resolutions on 
terrorism: 1373 (2001), 1540 (2004), and 1624 (2005).  
Organized crime has been the most important target of protection policies in the past few years. In 
order to make the police and military more reliable in regards to drug trafficking, the Mexican 
government has increased the salaries of its army by 40.9 percent and navy by 57.5 percent since 2006 
(Presidency of the Republic 2008b). Many cities and states have also announced pay raises for their 
police force, amounting to as much as 40 percent, to dissuade the police from joining the “narcos.” 
Likewise, since 2007, the office of Public Security Secretary replaced 284 federal police commanders 
and ordered federal and state officers to undergo training courses with United States, Canadian, and 
European experts (Padgett 2007).  
The United States is key to any analysis of Mexico’s fight against drugs, as about 90 percent of the 
cocaine that enters the United States is trafficked through Mexico; Mexico is also the United States’ 
largest foreign supplier of marijuana. Additionally, a 2007 report indicated that 99 percent of all 
methamphetamine produced in the country is exported to the United States (United Nations 2008). 
However, bilateral cooperation is permeated by a distrust that operates in two directions. On the one 
hand, in light of the structural weaknesses of the Mexican state as a security provider, the United 
States is inclined to adopt unilateral policies. On the other, as a result of US interventionism history in 
Mexico and the disparity of power between the two countries, Mexico has been reluctant to cooperate 
in the area of security. Against this background, drug trafficking has been one of the main sources of 
threat in the bilateral relationship. The power amassed by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) has 
challenged the ability of the Mexican government to curb corruption in the forces fighting the 
phenomenon (Chabat 2012). Due to its illegal nature, the magnitude of the economic power of drug 
trafficking organizations is unclear and the estimates vary depending of the sources and the calculation 
method: the US Justice Department estimates that the profit of Mexican and Colombian cartels reach 
between 18 and 39 USD billion from drug sales in the United States each year; the RAND Corporation 
calculates that all Mexican cartels generate close to 7 USD billion; and the Mexican Secretariat of 
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Public Security speculated that the cartels spend more than one billion USD each year just to bribe the 
municipal police (Keefe 2012). 
The inability of the Mexican government control the power of DTOs, has produced operations that 
either implicitly or explicitly illustrate the distrust of the US government on the Mexican government 
as a reliable partner. Such operations include Operation Intercept (1969), which consisted of 
exhaustive searches of vehicles entering the United States through the Mexican border; Second 
Operation Intercept (1985), which was implemented two weeks after Enrique Camarena, an agent of 
the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), was abducted in Guadalajara; and Operation Casablanca 
(1998), which was developed by the DEA and the Treasury Department to uncover banks engaged in 
money laundering without informing the Mexican government. Another sign of distrust came into 
light as a result of the assassination of a US Border Patrol agent in December of 2010 with guns 
connected to the Fast and Furious Operation. This operation consisted of 2,000 weapons that the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives purposefully did not seize between 2009 and 
2011 and allowed to be imported to Mexico by illegal buyers known as “straw purchasers” (O'Keefe 
2012). In this context, based on cables made available by WikiLeaks in 2012, the US Ambassador to 
Mexico, Carlos Pascual, put into question “the ability of the Mexican army to pursue drug-trafficking 
organizations, warned about poor coordination among local security forces, and complained about 
official corruption, among other statements” (Economist Intelligence Unit 2011). 
While US unilateral actions have produced tensions in the bilateral relationship, sequential post-
facto dialogues have been produced as remedies to alleviate distrust and eventually to pave the way for 
temporary cooperation. Some examples include the creation of the bilateral High Level Contact Group 
(1996) after the unilateral Casablanca Operation; the establishment of the Operation Falcon (1990) 
after the kidnap of Alvarez Machain; and the Operations Cooperation and Condor after the unilateral 
Operation Intercept (Chabat 2012). A turning point in the bilateral cooperation is the Merida Initiative 
(MI) because this is the first time the US provided military and police assistance to Mexico. In 
qualitative terms, the MI implies a change in perception in the bilateral relationship. On the one hand, 
the US government acknowledged that the US is corresponsive of the violence that has occurred in 
Mexico due to the high levels of drug consumption in the United States. On the other, the Mexican 
government also recognizes that the country needs the help of its northern neighbour to fight against 
organized crime. Thirty years ago, it would have been difficult for the Mexican government to resort 
to US help in security matters. In quantitative terms, however, the MI does not represent a significant 
amount of money because the US government only contributed 1.2 billion dollars for three years 
(2007-2010). This amount is insufficient compared to the Mexican challenge of drug trafficking. More 
precisely, some elements included in the MI are the following: a) non-intrusive inspection equipment, 
b) software to improve communications, c) training for investigators and prosecutors, d) introduction 
of a witness protection program, e) thirteen Bell 412 EP utility helicopters and eight much larger UH-
60 Black Hawk transport helicopters, f) four Spanish-built CASA CN-235 planes, and g) anti-gang 
equipment (Langton 2011). 
While the progress made by the MI is modest, it has paved the way for further multinational 
cooperation. The most graphic example of the widening US support for President Calderon’s strategy 
was the confirmation in March 2011 that the US Predator and Global Hawk drones were flying over 
Mexican territory in an effort to locate suspected drug traffickers and track their movements (Galen 
Carpenter 2011). Likewise, the Department of Defense (DoD) increased its counter-narcotics support 
to Mexico by 17-fold from funding levels of 3 USD million per year before 2009 to 51 USD million in 
fiscal year 2011, according to a top Pentagon official (Mora 2012). 
Another area of policies of protection is public health. Mexico has not securitized the outbreak of 
natural pandemics, but on a regional level, Mexico, United States, and Canada have worked to 
mitigate the impact of pandemics. The three countries have outlined a collaborative approach in the 
North American Plan for Avian and Pandemic Influenza. The implementation of actions in the three 
countries to timely control the 2010 swine flu showed that cooperation works. 
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Compellence Policies 
There is no evidence that Mexico has engaged or ever will engage in military operations abroad. 
However, under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the UN, Mexico has 
participated in four peacekeeping operations with civilian staff. The UN missions include the UN 
Verification Mission in Guatemala in 1994 and the UN operation in Timor Leste during 2005. More 
recently, operations occurred under the legal authority of the OAS: Mexico participated in the 2004 
OAS Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti and the Mission to Support the Peace 
Process in Colombia. 
During the seven decades of PRI governments, Mexico consistently denied using military force to 
solve international problems. This resulted in a doctrine in which the armed forces focused more on 
the preservation of internal order (Díez and Nicholls 2006). In the 1990s, in light of the growing threat 
of drug trafficking, the armed forces increased their presence in civil institutions, emulating the 
responsibilities of law enforcement. Although the armed forces focused primarily on domestic 
security, the external component has been important as well. In 2001, President Fox argued that the 
1947 Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, also known as the Rio Treaty, had become 
obsolete with the end of the Cold War, and that his government, after consulting other Latin American 
nations, would withdraw from it in 2002.  
While the hemispheric military doctrines of Mexico and the United States have diverged, the 
bilateral military relationship has been reinforced since 2001. Information sharing and military 
cooperation have taken place on different levels, particularly since the revamping of U.S. military 
structures. Mexico is considered an area of responsibility for the US Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM). Formed in October 2002 and operational since October 2003, NORTHCOM’s 
international role has been to build and to sustain relationships and to acquire the capabilities 
necessary to deter, detect, prevent, and defeat current emerging threats in all domains. The relationship 
does not include the stationing of U.S. troops on Mexican soil, the transfer of large modern military 
hardware to Mexico, or the Mexican commitment of troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. However, it has 
led to the Mexican adoption of U.S. standards and practices in terms of security procedures and 
widespread intelligence sharing (IISS 2008). While military cooperation with the United States is quite 
important, Mexico’s non-intervention sentiment could be argued as isolationist, or believing that most 
international affairs should come second to the country itself. This position was reiterated again in 
early 2003 when, as a member of the UN Security Council, Mexico refused to support the U.S. 
initiative to attack Iraq. This decision alienated the Bush Administration and forestalled a meaningful 
bilateral dialogue at the Presidential level for the remaining term of Fox administration (Roett 2005).
3
  
The size of the Mexican armed forces increased with the expansion in both its responsibilities and 
budget allocation. While in 1985, the total number of active personnel stood at approximately 130,000, 
that number increased to almost 240,000 by 2009. The main increase occurred within the Army, while 
the Navy and Air Force have experienced a more modest growth. While the armed forces have taken 
on newer roles, such as combating drug trafficking, this has not lead to a significant increase in 
government spending within its sector. The total government expenditure on the military has remained 
stable for the past two decades, consuming between 0.4 and 0.5 percent of national GDP. The main 
variation took place in 1996, when the expenditure reached 0.6 percent of the GDP, with the 
emergence of guerrilla groups in the states of Chiapas and Guerrero (Central Intelligence Agency 
2008). Mexican military expenditures as a share of GDP are comparable to countries such as 
Bahamas, Gambia, Georgia, and Laos, but more importantly are in line with the Latin American 
average of 0.54 percent of GDP. In order to combat drug cartels, however, the Mexican military has 
undergone a process of modernization. Despite important investments in new equipment, including 
                                                     
3
 An important turning point came with the November 2003 resignation of the Mexican ambassador to the UN, Adolfo 
Aguilar Zinser, who, as a defender of Mexico’s independent foreign policy, was viewed by the White House as a 
negative element in the relations between Mexico City and Washington. 
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helicopters and light aircraft in the past few years, the public still believes that the military still lacks 
the necessary resources to combat drug traffickers successfully.  
Assessment 
The examination of the Mexican policies of security governance provides the foundation for a 
comprehensive understanding of the Mexican security culture. The assessment of security governance 
in Mexico reveals a government working emphatically on combating organized crime, a priority 
captured by the massive allocation of resources to that task. However, the security culture has 
gradually evolved in the past 20 years by broadening the concept of security whereby more public 
policies have included a security component. 
Several obstacles have hampered the role of the Mexican state as a security provider. Foremost is 
the weakness of the Mexican government to implement effectively the rule of law. However, from the 
perspective of the security governance framework, a deeper obstacle is that most of the officially 
recognized threats are regional or international in nature. Thus, the four policy domains possess a 
common feature: each is approached from a Westphalian orientation towards the external 
environment. In the area of foreign policy, debates are developing over the viability of the non-
interference principle given the external and internal security context facing the Mexican government. 
Nonetheless, Mexico has become more, rather than less, cautious towards participating and 
implementing international assurance and compellence policies. When issues related to democracy 
promotion and peacekeeping operations rises, Mexico relies upon the principle of non-interference and 
refrains from active participation in several international forums. 
Unlike the European Union where a post-Westphalian security culture prevails, Mexico is part of 
the North American region where Westphalian values are still dominant. However, increasing levels 
of cooperation between Mexico and the United States are being realized in the areas of combat against 
organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism. Some initiatives, such as the Security and Prosperity 
Partnership or the Merida Initiative, suggest a different direction in Mexican security policy: deeper 
cooperation without the construction of regional institutions of governance. Consequently, dense 
cooperation with its neighbours remains low and the use of regional actors to address collective threats 
are absent. In sum, Mexico has modified its Westphalian preoccupation with sovereignty and has 
opened up channels for deeper cooperation, a development that would have been proscribed by the 
Mexican security culture as recently as a decade ago. This change has occurred in those policy areas 
where there is a shared understanding of common regional threats, such as the actions of drug 
trafficking groups. This transformation of Mexico’s Westphalian security culture is ongoing. Mexican 
political elites and publics will continue to reconsider those tenets of its security culture that pose a 
barrier to the safety of its citizens and the stability of the region.  
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